Thanks for the heads up, I was not aware of Jaing's history.
However in this case, we do not have to be that worried. Due to the Mixmaster protocol and design, all that the operator of the eelbash remailer can identify is the server he recieved it from and the one he forwarded it to. The first remailer strips off all identifying information about the sender and the message itself is encrypted so only the last server can reassemble and decrypt it.
Now, having said that you're right and we should avoid any questionable remailers. I will work up a new example as soon as I have a chance.
Good info.
Thanks for the heads up, I was not aware of Jaing's history.
However in this case, we do not have to be that worried. Due to the Mixmaster protocol and design, all that the operator of the eelbash remailer can identify is the server he recieved it from and the one he forwarded it to. The first remailer strips off all identifying information about the sender and the message itself is encrypted so only the last server can reassemble and decrypt it.
Now, having said that you're right and we should avoid any questionable remailers. I will work up a new example as soon as I have a chance.
Thanks again,
Dave